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1 Introduction 
The frequency of cybersecurity incidents continues to grow. For example, according to data collected by 
Privacy Rights ClearingHouse (n.d.), more than 7,730 data breach incidents have been made public in the 
period from 2005 to October, 2017 (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Annual Number of Data Breaches and Exposed Records in USA (2005-2016) 
(Identity Theft Resource Center, n.d.) 
These data breach incidents have resulted in more than one trillion compromised individual records 
(Identity Theft Resource Center. (n.d.). In reality, this number should be much higher because 1) several 
incidents have an unknown number of breached records and 2) Privacy Rights Clearinghouse does not 
comprehensively compile all data breach incidents.  
In addition to compromising protected data, threat agents can potentially target societally vital systems 
such as those that manage power grids, telecommunications networks, transportation networks, and 
transports (e.g., automobiles, airplanes). Such systems, often called cyberphysical systems (CPS), refer 
to networked systems of cyber (computation and communication) and physical (sensors and actuators) 
components that one uses to manage and operate critical infrastructure (Ashibani & Mahmoud 2017). 
CPS can offer a bigger attack surface to the threat agents (Shukla, 2016). Furthermore, CPS have 
increasingly begun to rely on remotely managed insecure Internet-of-things (IoT) devices, which makes 
these systems increasingly vulnerable (Colbert, 2017). For example, as the smart power grids begin to 
rely more on sensors such as synchrophasors (U.S. Department of Energy. (n.d.).) whose data are 
communicated over a communication network, they become vulnerable to attackers who can spoof sensor 
measurements. Incidents in which attackers have breached CPS include power blackouts in Brazil (Conti, 
2010), the StuxNet computer worm (Farwell & Rohozinski, 2011), and various other industrial security 
breaches (Pasqualetti, Dorfler, & Bullo, 2013).  
More recently, in the beginning of 2018, NPR began reporting serious vulnerabilities in electronic chips 
that Intel, ARM, and AMD manufacture (Neuman 2018). Attackers could exploit these vulnerabilities to 
gain access to the protected memory on the chips. Going into the future, cybersecurity incidents will 
increasingly impact software, hardware, national infrastructure, defense, social life, and the daily 
operations of individuals and organizations.  
In brief, cybersecurity continues to increase in importance. Indeed, the increasing budget that 
organizations allocate to it evidences this growing importance (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Spending on Cybersecurity in the USA from 2010 to 2018 (in Billion USD) 
(Identity Theft Resource Center, n.d.) 
However, cybersecurity investments have an uncertain effectiveness. While one could argue that an 
increased security budget has slowed the growth rate of cybersecurity incidents, no empirical evidence 
supports this assertion. I propose that the state of cybersecurity is poor due to certain technical, 
economic, legal, and user behavioral challenges that researchers and organizations have yet to address. 
In this paper, I discuss some of these challenges, current initiatives to address them, and the extent to 
which these initiatives have succeeded in their goals. 
2 Technical Challenge: Bad Code 
The existence of vulnerabilities in popular software products constitutes one primary reason for poor 
cybersecurity (Schmidt & White, 2017). The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)1 
defines vulnerability in software systems as: 
A flaw or weakness in system security procedures, design, implementation, or internal controls 
that could be exercised (accidentally triggered or intentionally exploited) and result in a security 
breach or a violation of the system's security policy. (Radack, 2012) 
Attackers frequently exploit these vulnerabilities (Kaspersky Lab, 2017). For example, hackers stole 
EternalBlue, an exploit for the Server Message Block (SMB) vulnerability2, from the US National Security 
Agency (NSA). They used it to launch the ransomware attacks WannaCry in May, 2017, and NotPetya in 
June, 2017 (Meyer, 2017). So how serious are the concerns about vulnerabilities in software? From 
searching the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)3, I found a graph (see Figure 3) that shows the 
number of vulnerabilities disclosed per year between 2005 and 2017. The number of vulnerabilities 
disclosed by the end of 2017 already exceeded 14,000. Of course, all vulnerabilities do not pose the same 
risk. Qualys4, a cloud security company, analyzed 40 million security scans and found that “just 10 percent 
of vulnerabilities are responsible for 90 percent of all cybersecurity exposures” (Chong, 2013). Still, 
vulnerabilities in general clearly represent a major cybersecurity concern. 
                                                     
1 https://www.nist.gov/  
2 CVE Number: CVE-2017-0144 
3 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search  
4 https://www.qualys.com/  
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Figure 3. Number of Vulnerabilities Disclosed Per Year Since 2005 (Adapted from National Vulnerability 
Database) 
Software producers are not unconcerned about vulnerabilities in their products; in fact, various sources 
have undertaken initiatives to eliminate vulnerabilities in software. For example: 
• Microsoft started its Trustworthy Computing Initiative in 2002 to reduce the number of 
vulnerabilities at the design, coding, and documentation stages of their product development. 
As a result of this initiative, Microsoft created the security development lifecycle (SDL), which it 
introduced to software developers in 2004. Post SDL, Microsoft reported 45 percent fewer 
vulnerabilities a year after launching Windows Vista than in the same time after launching 
Windows XP, which the company developed before SDL. Similarly, SQL Server 2005 had 91 
percent fewer reported vulnerabilities than the pre-SDL SQL Server 2000 (Ashford, 2012). 
While commendable, Microsoft’s efforts do not represent the whole software industry. Unless 
all software producers develop and implement similar programs, we will continue to have 
vulnerable software. 
• IEEE has published a set of guidelines to help companies establish a secure baseline for 
software developed for medical devices to reduce or eliminate vulnerabilities that attackers can 
exploit to gain access to medical devices (Haigh & Landwehr, 2015).  
• The avionics industry has defined rigorous software security requirements for commercial 
aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles in a certification document known as DO-178C (Howard, 
2012).  
• The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has developed a reference 
resource (see Rossman et al., 2008)  to help U.S. federal government agencies in integrating 
essential information technology (IT) security steps into their IT system development lifecycle 
(SDLC).  
However, in most cases, these best practices and guidelines are not mandatory.  
• In 1976, Turing Award winners Edsger Dijkstra and Tony Hoare proposed a formally verified 
software approach to coding. This approach requires that each statement in the code should 
follow logically from the preceding one, which allows for one to test the whole program with the 
same certainty with which mathematicians prove theorems (Hartnett, 2016). In line with the 
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above recommendation, a research group called DeepSpec5 has begun to develop formally 
verified computer systems. Furthermore, tools such as TLA+6, Coq7 and Isabelle8 support this 
approach to writing software. The promise that approach to coding shows has caused some 
journalists to claim that it will result in “perfect, hacker proof code” (Hartnett, 2016). However, 
developers who use this approach to software development face a significant challenge. 
Before a developer can use it, the developer must accurately and precisely 1) describe the 
software’s correct behavior and 2) proscribe its incorrect behavior. However, doing so is 
difficult. For instance, Tony Hoare has acknowledged that the enormous effort required to 
exactly specify a software’s functionality and performance under all conditions is not worth the 
perceived benefits (Tedre, 2015). Therefore, developers who use formal methods have 
moderated their goals. Instead of trying to create entire fully verified computer systems, most 
developers just focus on verifying smaller but especially vulnerable or critical pieces of a 
system (Hartnett, 2016). 
• Eric Raymond, one of the most ardent proponents of open source software, claims that “given 
enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow” (Raymond, 2000). The open source software 
development approach requires one to share the software code in the public domain, which 
allows other developers to analyze the code for any vulnerabilities and then fix the ones that 
they find. According to Raymond, an open source software development approach will more 
likely discover vulnerabilities compared to a closed source approach. Some evidence suggests 
that open source software development removes vulnerabilities at a faster pace than closed 
source software (Altinkemer, & Rees, & Sriidhar, 2008). However, Schryen (2011) recently 
found that open source and closed source software development do not significantly differ in 
terms of vulnerability disclosure and vendors’ patching behavior. Furthermore, no convincing 
evidence suggests that an open source software development approach results in fewer 
vulnerabilities to start with. In fact, Levy (2000) asserts that: “Sure, the source code is 
available. But is anyone reading it?”. He found no evidence that users carefully analyzed open 
source code to find and remove vulnerabilities.   
All the above examples of corporate initiatives, development methods, and developer efforts have one 
thing in common: none are ambitious enough to shoot for software completely free from vulnerabilities. In 
fact, software developers widely believe that it is nearly impossible to write software with no vulnerabilities. 
Andrew Hunt (1999, p. 107) says: 
You Can't Write Perfect Software. Did that hurt? It shouldn't. Accept it as an axiom of life. 
Embrace it. Celebrate it. Because perfect software doesn't exist. No one in the brief history of 
computing has ever written a piece of perfect software. It's unlikely that you'll be the first. And 
unless you accept this as a fact, you'll end up wasting time and energy chasing an impossible 
dream. 
They hold this belief for many reasons: 
• Popular software applications are complex, and the number of lines a software application has 
represents one popular factor to measure that complexity (Weyuker, 1988). Carnegie Mellon 
University's CyLab Sustainable Computing Consortium estimates that commercial software 
contains 20 to 30 flaws for every 1,000 lines of code (Chong, 2013). Given that most popular 
software packages contain millions of lines of code (see Figure 4), and CyLab’s estimate of at 
least 20 flaws per 1,000 lines of code (some of which could be vulnerabilities as NIST defines 
them), one can safely assume that all large applications contain vulnerabilities. 
• One must compile software code before it can run in the production environment. Even if one 
assumes that a developer has written vulnerability-free code, the compiler may itself introduce 
vulnerabilities in the executable version of the application. For example, GCC, one of the most 
commonly used compilers, itself contains vulnerabilities9.   
                                                     
5 https://deepspec.org  
6 https://lamport.azurewebsites.net/tla/tla.html  
7 https://coq.inria.fr/  
8 https://isabelle.in.tum.de  
9 See https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/buglist.cgi?component=c%2B%2B&product=gcc&resolution=--- 
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Figure 4. Millions of Lines of Code in Some Popular Software (Boldt, 2017) 
• Software does not operate in isolation. Even the most basic program (written in any 
programming language) runs on an operating system, and, therefore, even simple programs 
are susceptible to vulnerabilities that may exist in the operating system. 
• Software products often use pre-existing software modules (e.g., libraries, components), which 
may not be secure. For example, some string functions (included in the programing language 
C/C++ libraries) are vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks (Erickson, 2008). To write a code 
completely free from vulnerabilities, one would need to ensure that every library used in the 
code is also 100 percent secure. A similar problem plagues open source software. An average 
commercial application uses more than 100 open source components. From analyzing 31 
billion open source components, retrieved from The Central Repository10, Sonatype (2016) 
states that one sixteenth of the components included at least one vulnerability and that 69 new 
vulnerable components were added to the repository per quarter. Therefore, researchers have 
unsurprisingly found that two thirds of commercial software applications have open source 
components with known vulnerabilities in them (Korolov, 2017).  
• To ensure that that software contains no design-related vulnerabilities, developers would need 
to examine every possible input to a program, the order of its commands, how data flows 
through the program, changes in the data as it flows through the program, and all possible 
execution paths that the program can take and to remove all race conditions (Weyuker, 1988). 
However, doing so requires skills and resources (e.g., time) that all software developers may 
not have. Even when they have the skills and the resources (e.g., as in the case of large 
software producers such as Microsoft and Apple), it might not be economically optimal for them 
to perform all these activities. In fact, they may be better off by releasing vulnerable software 
first and patching the vulnerabilities as and when they are discovered in the future (Arora, 
Nandkumar, & Telang, 2006). 
As such, software developers typically do not focus on writing perfectly secure code but on writing code in 
a way that minimizes the number of vulnerabilities and removing those vulnerabilities as and when they 
are discovered. The most widely used approaches to minimize the risk of cybersecurity incident due to 
software vulnerabilities include: 1) developing and distributing patches to fix the vulnerabilities, 2) using 
technical security controls such as antivirus software and firewall on hosts and servers, and 3) monitoring 
and evaluating network traffic using intrusion-detection and prevention system (IDPS). However, these 
methods to address the risks associated with vulnerabilities in software products and systems have their 
own technical challenges to overcome:  
                                                     
10 http://central.sonatype.org/  
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• Software patches and updates, being pieces of code, face the same development, design, and 
complexity challenges as any software. Therefore, they could (in theory) contain their own 
vulnerabilities that attackers could exploit. Furthermore, applying patches can cause “software 
regression” (i.e., the software stops working or performing as intended after a patch) (Nir, 
Tyszberowicz, & Yehudai, 2008). For example, software and firmware updates that Intel 
released to fix the recently discovered vulnerabilities Spectre11 and Meltdown12 vulnerabilities 
in their chips allegedly slowed down some Intel machines (Neuman, 2018). Finally, developers 
generally prioritize developing and distributing patches based on the public disclosure dates of 
vulnerabilities. This approach could leave software users vulnerable to exploits not yet publicly 
disclosed but that the software developer, security researchers, and the hacking community 
already know about (Sen & Heim, 2016).  
• Organizations and individuals often use technical controls such as anti-malware and firewalls 
to implement the security principal “defense in depth”. This principle rests on the rationale that 
additional layers of security provided by controls such as firewalls and anti-malware 
applications make it more difficult and costly for the threat agents to breach the protected 
system. While this approach has successfully minimized the risks from vulnerable software, it 
also has its limitations. For example, anti-virus software does not work well against newer, 
more sophisticated viruses, worms, and trojans (Thornton 2017), and firewall rules may have 
anomalies that attackers can exploit to gain access to protected systems (Hu, Ann, & Kulkarni, 
2012). Furthermore, users who rely on software security controls implicitly assume that these 
security applications are more secure than the software systems that they are trying to protect.  
One can test this assumption by searching for vulnerabilities discovered in two popular types of 
security software applications (i.e., antivirus and firewall). As such, I searched the National 
Vulnerability Database website and produced the graphs in Figures 5 and 6, which show the 
number of discovered vulnerabilities for antivirus and firewall software, respectively. As one 
can see, they still contain a significant number of vulnerabilities, an unsurprisingly result given 
that developers use the same principles to develop security software as any other type of 
software (whether open source or closed source). Therefore, one can safely assume that 
security software has the same security concerns (i.e., vulnerabilities) as any other software.  
 
Figure 5. Number of Vulnerabilities Discovered in Antivirus Software (Adapted from National Vulnerability 
Database) 
                                                     
11 See https://spectreattack.com/spectre.pdf  
12 See https://meltdownattack.com/meltdown.pdf  
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Figure 6. Number of Vulnerabilities Discovered in Firewall Software (Adapted from National Vulnerability 
Database) 
• Intrusion-detection systems (IDS) and intrusion-detection and prevention systems (IDPS) 
analyze network traffic to detect cyberattacks and alert system administrators when they do. 
These systems often constitute a key component in efforts to implement the “defense in depth” 
strategy that security practitioners use to project critical systems from cyberattacks. In fact, IDS 
is the most commonly used mechanism to detect cyberattacks on cloud systems (Mehmood, 
Habiba, Shibli, & Masood, 2013). However, IDS and IDPS offer their own set of unique 
challenges; for example: 1) practitioners find it difficult to decide where to place an IDS and 
how to best configure it when used in a distributed environment with multiple stakeholders 
(Werlinger, Hawkey, Muldner, Jaferian, & Beznosov, 2008), 2) several IDS and IDPS have a 
poor design and/or have incomplete database of attack signatures (Beigh, Bashir, & Chachoo, 
2013), 3) threat agents often target IDS (Corona, Giacinto, & Roli, 2013), and 4) IDS have their 
own vulnerabilities (see Figure 7). 
• To summarize, 1) one needs to accept that bad code (i.e., software with vulnerabilities) is 
inevitable; 2) developers use patches, updates, and technical controls to minimize the risk of 
cybersecurity incidents due to software vulnerabilities; and 3) patches, updates, and technical 
controls are also software, which means they can have their own vulnerabilities. Therefore, we 
have yet to successfully address the key technical challenge to cybersecurity (i.e., bad code). 
In Section 3, I analyze the economic factors that contribute to poor cybersecurity. 
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Figure 7. Number of Vulnerabilities Discovered in IDSs (Adapted from National Vulnerability Database) 
3 Economic Challenges to Cybersecurity 
The current literature on the economics of cyber security has identified several reasons that contribute to 
poor cybersecurity. 
3.1 Cooperation and Coordination Problems 
Competing firms all benefit from sharing cybersecurity information among themselves (Gal-Or & Ghosh, 
2005). Government initiatives such as the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) have resulted in sharing 
of vulnerability information among developers and users. Similarly data breach disclosure laws have 
forced organizations to share information about data breach incidents with those affected by the incident 
within a certain time period. However, we have yet to see any effective voluntary initiatives among 
relevant stakeholders in this direction. For example, cooperation among nation states can minimize the 
likelihood that cyberwar will occur. All countries with cyberwar capabilities need to reach an agreement 
(e.g., as in the case of chemical and nuclear weapons) that limits and ultimately curbs their cyberwar 
program. However, for such an agreement to happen, each nation has to: 1) realize that their cyberwar 
capabilities are no better than that of their adversaries, 2) trust that their adversaries will adhere to the 
agreement, 3) believe that they are better off by adhering to the agreement instead of breaking it. The fact 
that we have yet to witness such an agreement suggests that the conditions required for it do not exist. 
Consider another case: Internet service providers (ISP). ISP are in the best position to stop (or at the least 
minimize) attack traffic (e.g., distributed denial of service (DDoS), malware) from traveling through their 
networks. However, to be effective, they need to cooperate and coordinate with other ISP. This 
cooperation and coordination would require ISP to invest more in resources required to closely scrutinize 
network traffic, punish those ISP that do not cooperate, and reward those that do. At present, most if not 
all ISP seem to have no economic rationale to cooperate and make the additional investments required for 
the subsequent coordination.  
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3.2 Perverse Incentives and Lack of Incentives 
Researchers have often blamed perverse and/or a lack of incentives for poor cybersecurity (Anderson, 
2001; Moore & Anderson, 2012). Some examples include: 
• Some software producers reward their developers for how many bugs they have fixed (Maiguy, 
2013). Without accountability for who created the flaw, this practice simply provides a perverse 
incentive to the developers to release vulnerable software that they will then subsequently be 
rewarded for “fixing”. It is probably better to reward developers for “bug-free features” or 
“lowest bug count” (Maiguy, 2013).  
• A lack of incentives plays a role in cases where the entity tasked with protecting information 
assets is not the one that primarily suffers from cybersecurity incidents (e.g., Anderson, 2001), 
such as in the case of organizations who operate critical infrastructure (Moore, 2010). Take the 
example of the U.S. Office of Personal Management (OPM). OPM acquires, stores, and 
manages employee data on millions of Americans. It suffered a massive data breach that it 
publicly disclosed in 2015 (Koerner, 2016). While the federal employees whose information 
was stolen faced possible identity theft as a result of this incident, it is not clear if OPM faced 
any serious sanctions for its failure to protect employee data. In the absence of such sanctions, 
OPM itself has minimal economic incentive to invest in its data-protection operations.  
3.3 Asymmetric Information 
When software users have less information than developers about software quality (in terms of number of 
vulnerabilities in the software), the market will likely comprise vulnerable software (Anderson, 2001). To 
evaluate software, a user organization would have to spend a significant amount of time and resources in 
testing the software to find its vulnerabilities. However, an organization is unlikely to do so for the same 
economic reasons that the software producer had when it released vulnerable software. That is, the 
investment in time and resources required to completely assess software for unknown vulnerabilities is not 
worth the effort. This situation leads to information asymmetry between the user organization and the 
software vendor, and, therefore, the market for enterprise software also likely suffers from quality 
concerns (Anderson, 2001).   
3.4 Asymmetric Conflict 
The conflict between parties who defend software systems and those who attack them favors the 
attackers. The defenders have to find out all the software vulnerabilities before anyone else does and 
patch them. On the other hand, attackers only have to find one vulnerability that the defender has not yet 
discovered/patched and exploit it (Anderson, 2001). Defenders respond to attacks by patching known 
vulnerabilities; yet, as soon as they fix one flaw, attackers identify and exploit another one (Böhme & 
Moore 2009). Chia, Chuang, and Chen (2016) compare this scenario with the game of whack-a-mole. 
They propose that, even with a resource disadvantage, an attacker can use information asymmetry (i.e., 
knowledge of vulnerabilities unknown to the defender) to its advantage.   
3.5 Financial Gains 
In the global vulnerability marketplace, the world’s top “bug bounty hunters” can earn financial rewards for 
their discoveries (Roberts, 2015). Market makers such as HackerOne13 and Zerodium14 provide an easy-
to-use platform to match sellers and buyers of vulnerabilities. Organizations as diverse as software 
developers (e.g., Microsoft, Google, Yahoo), automobile manufacturers (e.g., Fiat Chrysler Automobiles, 
General Motors), government organizations (e.g., Pentagon, U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services), and security consultants (e.g., iDefense) offer bounty programs that invite researchers and 
hackers to find vulnerabilities in software and receive pay for their efforts15. In addition to the sponsors of 
bounty programs, the buyers of vulnerabilities also include nation states, military intelligence, and law 
enforcement agencies. Even if we ignore the ethical concerns associated with such markets, we still have 
to deal with the predicament that these unregulated markets are not optimal for social welfare in most 
cases (Kannan & Telang, 2005). In fact, federally funded mechanisms, such as CERT, for disclosing 
                                                     
13 See https://www.hackerone.com/ 
14 See https://zerodium.com/ 
15 See http://securityledger.wpengine.com/?s=bug+bounty  
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vulnerability information always perform better (Kannan & Telang, 2005). Nevertheless, the vulnerability 
markets exist and are here to stay. These markets provide financial incentives to individuals and 
organizations to discover and sell vulnerabilities, which result in more discovered vulnerabilities. The 
proponents argue that these markets speed up the process of vulnerability discovery and, as a result: 1) 
motivate software developers to come up with relevant patches and 2) warn users so that they can take 
steps to protect against potential cyberattacks. On the other hand, more discovered vulnerabilities also 
provide more opportunities to threat agents and, therefore, translate into more attacks against vulnerable 
systems (Arora et al., 2006). One way to counter these vulnerability markets rests in developing better 
vulnerability-discovery and disclosure mechanisms. These mechanisms can provide incentives to 
individuals and organizations to discover vulnerabilities and share relevant information with users and 
software developers more quickly. By preempting the financially motivated “bug hunters”, such 
mechanisms will weaken the existing markets for vulnerabilities. Google’s Project Zero constitutes a good 
example. It’s most recent success came in early 2018 when its researchers were among those who 
discovered the vulnerabilities Spectre16 and Meltdown17 in widely used chips from Intel, ARM, and AMD 
(Neuman, 2018). However, we need more such initiatives to counter or significantly weaken existing 
vulnerability markets.  
3.6 Weak Market Forces 
Market forces such as competition, consumer reaction, and investor responses are instrumental in 
encouraging companies to improve their products and services. These forces are, however, weak in the 
software industry.  
3.6.1 Little Competition 
A competitive software market requires transparent prices. In the software market, while most desktop 
and mobile applications have reasonably transparent pricing, enterprise software does not (e.g., 
enterprise resource planning (ERP) and customer relationship management (CRM)). For infrastructure 
and enterprise software, their owners do not often publish its price. When they do, they do so in in a 
manner that one cannot easily objectively compare with competing products (e.g., setup, maintenance, 
configuration, customizations, and total cost of ownership). A competitive market also requires a certain 
number of competitors; however, major software market segments suffer from a lack of serious 
competition. For example, Microsoft and Apple dominate the desktop operating system segment, 
Microsoft leads the office productivity segment (e.g., MS Office), Google’s Android (and its derivatives) 
and Apple’s iOS dominate the mobile operating system segment. The enterprise software segment has 
seen a trend toward growth by acquisition (e.g., SAP’s acquisition of Business Object, and Oracle’s 
acquisition of PeopleSoft), which has resulted in few dominant players. This lack of competition has an 
adverse impact on not only developers’ motivation to write secure code but also the way software 
producers respond to vulnerabilities discovered in their products. For example, in a recent study, Jo 
(2017) found that a lack of competition among software vendors adversely impacts a software vendor’s 
response to vulnerabilities in its product (i.e., releasing patches). One explanation could be that, in 
software market segments with a dominant vendor, software users have relatively weak bargaining power. 
Therefore, these users have minimal influence on vendor’s patch release behavior, which, in turn, could 
result in delayed patch releases. 
3.6.2 Unconcerned Investors 
Multiple studies have shown that an announcement that a firm (other than software producer) has 
experienced a cybersecurity breach negatively impacts its stock price (Cavusoglu, Mishra, & 
Raghunathan, 2004; Acquisti, Friedman, & Telang, 2006; Telan & Wattal 2007; Kannan, Rees, & Sridhar, 
2007). This impact is more severe in competitive markets. However, the cybersecurity breaches in these 
studies had no longer-term effect on the market valuation of the affected firms (Cavusoglu et al., 2004; 
Acquisti et al., 2006; Kannan et al., 2007). Thus, given that investors’ tepid reaction to cyberattacks, victim 
organizations seem to have minimal incentive to demand secure software from their software vendors. In 
cases where a software producer suffers from a cyberattack, the same logic applies. In the absence of a 
strong disapproval from investors, software producers are more likely to continue doing business as usual. 
                                                     
16 See https://spectreattack.com/spectre.pdf  
17See  https://meltdownattack.com/meltdown.pdf  
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3.6.3 Apathetic Customers 
If customers respond to discoveries of vulnerabilities in software products by switching to competing 
products, then software producers might have an economic incentive to produce more secure software (at 
least in comparison to their competition). However, existing evidence suggests that customers are at best 
apathetic to security weaknesses either in the software that they themselves use or in the software that 
the vendors of the product and services that they purchase use. A survey that the Ponemon Institute 
conducted for Experian found that repeated announcements about data breaches and other cyberattacks 
has made consumers immune to these events (Experian, 2014). Found from conducting surveys with 
users, Ablon, Heaton, Lavery, and Romanosky (2016) found that they were unlikely to switch firms even 
after the firms have suffered from data breaches. In fact, only 11 percent of respondents stopped dealing 
with the affected company following a breach. Therefore, these firms have minimal incentive to force their 
software vendors to provide more secure code.  
In brief, most software market segments feature a lack of serious competition, unfazed investors, and 
indifferent customers. As a result, market forces only weakly (at best) motivate firms to invest in 
cybersercuity. Furthermore, asymmetric information between software users and developers, the inherent 
advantage that attackers enjoy over defenders, and perverse incentives also have an adverse impact on 
cybersecurity. In Section 4, I investigate software users’ contribution to poor cybersecurity. 
4 Software Users 
The number of people who use software and have access to high-speed Internet has continued to grow. 
According to Internet World Stats (Miniwatts Marketing Group, 2018), this number was 3.89 billion in 
2017—almost half of the world population. According to researchers and security professionals, these 
users must share a large proportion of the blame for lack of cybersecurity (Krazit, 2016; Culp, 2016).  
4.1 Unprepared and/or Irresponsible 
Software users do not always follow security procedures such as encrypting sensitive data, enabling 
access controls, and changing default access credentials (e.g., username and password). Sometimes, 
they just need to upgrade their software to fix known vulnerabilities. However, they often continue to use 
old and often discontinued software. For example, people still use Windows XP, an operating system that 
Microsoft stopped supporting on 8 April, 2014 (Bell, 2016). Surprisingly, as of October, 2017, Windows XP 
was the fourth-most popular desktop operating system (OS) in use (see Figure 8). Further, even third-
party developers such as Google have stopped providing applications for Windows XP (Kleinman, 2015). 
By continuously using unsupported software such as Windows XP, users put themselves at risk from 
cyberattacks such as the ransomware WannaCry (Erlanger, Bilefsky, & Chan, 2017). 
Security professionals also fail to update their software in a timely manner. A 2015 survey by Google 
found that: 1) more than one third of security professionals do not keep their systems current, 2) only 64 
percent of security experts update their software automatically or immediately when notified about the 
availability of a new version, and 3) just 38 percent of regular users do the same (Redmiles, 2017). 
Another study in 2012 that Skype sponsored found that 40 percent of users do not update their software 
when prompted and about a quarter skip the updates because they did not understand the benefits 
(McAllister, 2012). 
4.2 Behind on Patch Application 
As I establish in Section 2, one cannot develop software with zero vulnerabilities. Currently, software 
developers usually apply patches to fix vulnerabilities. However, this approach has a questionable 
effectiveness because many users do not update their systems. From the time a patch appears, it takes  
software engineers and regular users 24 days and 45 days on average, respectively, to apply it 
(Redmiles, 2017). One might ask why users do not patch their systems in a timely manner. The answer 
could lie in a 2016 survey by researchers from the University of Edinburgh and Indiana University 
(Redmiles, 2017). The researchers asked participants to discuss their experiences of installing software 
patches. Nearly half of them said the high frequency of patch releases frustrated them. Many users also 
expressed dissatisfaction with the time it took to apply patches, lost productivity during that time, and 
software-regression concerns (especially in cases of specialized and customized software). The 
companies that distribute patches do not always help as well. For example, Microsoft released 18 patches 
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on 14 March, 2017. Among these patches included one that fixed the vulnerability that the ransomware 
WannaCry later exploited. However, the patch rating score that Microsoft provided did not clearly convey 
the severity of this vulnerability. Even security experts failed to identify the fix for WannaCry as a critic 
patch to apply (Redmiles, 2017). As a result, even though one could already obtain a patch that fixed it, 
WannaCry managed to infect hundreds of thousands of unpatched Windows machines in more than 150 
countries in May, 2017. 
 
Figure 8. Desktop Operating System Market Share October, 2017 (Netapplications.com, 2017) 
4.3 Unaware and/or Poorly Trained Users 
According to the ACC Foundation’s “State of Cybersecurity Report”, cybersecurity incidents often result 
from employee error (ACC Foundation, 2015). BUPA, an international healthcare group headquartered in 
the United Kingdom that serves 32 million customers in 190 countries, revealed that their most recent 
security breach occurred when one of their employees inappropriately copied and removed information 
(Stanley, 2017). This incident is not isolated. In fact, many cybersecurity professionals believe that 
individuals (i.e., users and employees) share the most blame for cybersecurity incidents (Krazit, 2016; 
Culp, 2016).  For example: 
• Individuals often use weak passwords, share their passwords with friends and family, and use 
the same password for multiple accounts/applications. For instance, closely examining some 
major recent data breaches (e.g., Yahoo, U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Anthem, and 
the Democratic National Committee) reveals a common theme. In every incident, the attack 
vector has been a weak password (Chertoff, 2016). In organizational settings, one can easily 
address concerns related to weak passwords by enforcing strong password policies on 
employees. However, for personal systems, this approach might not be practical. In theory, 
software developers can implement strong password-based access controls or biometric-
based access controls in their applications. However, doing so might adversely impact users 
from adopting the software. Therefore, developers might hesitate to enforce strong access-
control mechanisms. Instead, they are more likely to offer various access control options (e.g., 
PIN code, password, biometric, etc.) and leave the decision to users while hoping that they will 
chose the strongest possible access control. However, no empirical evidence suggests that 
users chose the most secure access control option. 
• Individuals frequently fall prey to social-engineering attacks such as phishing (e.g., Canfield, 
Fischhoff, & Davis, 2016). Vishwanath (2016) found several reasons as to why people fall 
victim to phishing attacks: 1) they naturally seek “cognitive efficiency” (i.e., maximal information 
for minimal brain effort), 2) when they see familiar logos and brand names, they assume that 
the (phishing) message is legitimate and act accordingly, 3) some wrongly assume that their 
online actions are inherently safe, and 4) some become complacent because they routinely 
use emails and do not spend enough time in scrutinizing the emails that they receive. To help 
alleviate these issues, Security experts often provide relevant training to employees, which 
should reflect the latest threats and occur as frequently as possible, (e.g., Drolet, 2016). 
35 Challenges to Cybersecurity: Current State of Affairs 
 
Volume 43  10.17705/1CAIS.04302 Paper 2  
 
Vishwanath (2016) suggests that training should simulate phishing attacks and provide 
relevant feedback to users about their performance. However, this training has a debatable 
effectiveness. For instance, 32 percent of employees who received training at a major bank 
clicked on a phishing link in the weeks following a training class in comparison to 35 percent of 
those who received no training (Prince, 2017). In another case, JPMorgan boosted its 
cybersecurity spending after a data theft, but, several weeks after the training when it tested 
the staff with a fake phishing email, 20 percent of them clicked on it (Drolet, 2016).  In a real 
scenario similar to the test, that action would have downloaded a malicious payload onto the 
bank’s network (Drolet, 2016). 
• Individuals do not seem to understand online threats even after continuous warnings from the 
system (Wolff, 2015) and frequently ignore these warnings (Bravo-Lillo, Cranor, Downs, & 
Komanduri, 2011). For example, Felt et al. (2015) found that people generally ignore SSL/TLS 
warnings: the messages that pop up in the browsers when a server cannot be authenticated or 
something is wrong with the encryption that protects the traffic between the browser and the 
server. However, many people continue with their browsing regardless of the warning. One 
could blame the presentation of these warning messages. However, Wolff (2015) found that 
changing the wording of warning seems to have minimal effect on user behavior. 
In brief, software users do not update and patch their software in a timely manner, do not often know 
about best cybersecurity practices, and often do not change their behavior after training. As a result, they 
continue to be instrumental in cybersecurity attacks. In the next section, I assess the role that laws and 
regulations play in the area of cybersecurity. 
5 Ineffective Laws and Regulations 
Any cybersecurity incident has several key stakeholders are: 1) the victim(s), 2) the threat agent(s) 
blamed for the incident (e.g., hackers, cyber criminals, nation states etc.), 3) the producer of the 
vulnerable system, and 4) the custodian of the system responsible for maintaining the system. Figure 9 
illustrates the different scenarios that represent the relationship between these stakeholders. The question 
is: how do the existing laws relevant to cybersecurity assign responsibility and assess liability among 
these stakeholders? I address this question by categorizing the laws into three types: 1) those that apply 
to threat agents, 2) those that apply to the custodian of legally protected data, and 3) those that apply to 
the software developer. 
5.1 Laws Applicable to Threat Agents 
Most countries have laws to target the threat agents of cybersecurity incidents. For example, in the US, 
several laws deter individuals and organizations from unauthorized intrusions into computer systems (e.g., 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), National Information Infrastructure Protection Act (NIIPA), 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), Economic Espionage Act (EEA), Wire Fraud Act (WFA), 
National Stolen Property Act (NSPA), and Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act (ITADA)). While 
these laws have been somewhat effective in discouraging threat agents in domestic boundaries, they 
have often been useless against cyberattacks that have originated from outside their jurisdiction. 
Cyberwars exemplify such attacks. On 27 April, 2007, Estonia suffered a crippling cyberattack launched 
from outside its borders. In 2009, attackers—allegedly the US and Israel, targeted an Iranian nuclear 
reactor facility using Stuxnet. More recently in December, 2015, and then again in December, 2016, the 
suspected Russian attack on Ukraine’s power grids, government department, business organizations 
illustrate the possibility and the capabilities of cyberwar (Greenberg, 2017). In all such cases, it is still 
unclear what legal rights a state or an organization has when it falls victim to cyberattacks from another 
country. The first hurdle in responding to such incidents is whether to classify them as merely cybercrimes 
or as cyberwar. Then one needs to attribute the attacks to the right threat agents. Even if one can identify 
the threat agents and one has solid evidence against them (e.g., as in the case of Russian cyberattack on 
Ukraine or North Korea’s role in releasing WannaCry (Reuters Staff, 2018), no clear consensus on how 
the victims could legally respond exists (e.g., with armed force, its own cyberattack, or take some other 
measures). Compounding the problem, the international laws that one could potentially apply to cyberwar 
are weak to non-existent (Shackelford, 2009). Hathaway et al. (2012) have offered suggestions on how to 
apply a combination of domestic criminal laws and existing international laws and treaties, with some 
amendments and modifications, to meet the distinct challenges that cyberattacks from nation states pose. 
However, the effectiveness of this approach has not yet been established because most of the existing 
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international laws and treaties that touch on cybersecurity do not carry practical enforcement provisions 
(Shackelford, 2009). 
 
Figure 9. Stakeholders in a Cybersecurity Incident 
5.2 Laws Applicable to Collectors and/or Custodians of Legally Protected Data 
Some laws in the US (e.g., HIPPA, GLB, and Sarbanes-Oxley) require individuals and organizations to 
protect certain types of data stored on their systems (e.g., personally identifiable information (PII), 
sensitive personal information (SPI), health, financial). Furthermore, some federal and state data breach 
notification laws require organizations to disclose any data breach that they suffer (Bisogni, 2016). 
However, the effectiveness of these laws in reducing the risk of cybersecurity incidents (e.g., data breach) 
remains unproven. While, Romanosky, Telang, and Acquisti (2011) found that data breach disclosure 
laws reduce identity theft resulting from data breach disclosure, it does not necessarily mean that these 
laws result in a decrease in the number of data breach incidents. Sen and Borle (2015) found that state 
data breach disclosure laws did not significantly impact the risk of data breaches in those states. 
Furthermore, the trend towards outsourcing data storage (e.g., to cloud platforms operated and managed 
by a third party) also complicates the application of these laws. For example, does the cloud computing 
environment absolve business entities of their responsibility to ensure proper data security or do they 
share joint responsibility with cloud service providers (Kaufman, 2009)? 
5.3 Laws Applicable to Software Producers 
Academics and practitioners have long debated whether one should subject software producers and 
developers to strict product liability laws (e.g., Chong, 2013; Evans, 2015; Goertzel, 2016, Beard, Ford, 
Koutsky, & Spiwak, 2010). When applied, strict liability makes a manufacturer responsible for all physical 
injuries and associated losses caused by a defective product that it produces (HeinOnline, 1998). Strict 
liability has resulted in better-quality products in several industries (e.g., automobile, toys, and medical 
equipment). However, product liability laws do not seem to have had any impact on software’s quality.  
We have yet to see any successful lawsuit against software producers under the strict product liability 
laws, though a case against Toyota represents one exception. It took a decade-long investigation and 
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experts’ reviewing software code over 28 months to prove that faulty code caused unintended 
accelerations in Toyota vehicles. These unintended accelerations resulted in several accidents. Toyota 
had to recall nine million vehicles and pay billions in settlements and fines (Somers, 2017). Clearly, 
proving that software vulnerability causes physical injury is a major challenge to suing software 
developers under strict liability laws (Beard et al., 2010). In addition, end-user software licenses (EULA) 
protect software developers from legal consequences due to strict liability laws. Almost all commercial 
over-the-counter software (COTS) comes with a EULA. EULA also cover customized software developed 
by third parties. Their wording means that one cannot easily establish software as a product, a key 
requirement of product liability laws. EULA establish software as being a service that the software 
producer provides to end users. This service comprises the clauses that allow users to use the software 
under strict and specific conditions. The EULA effectively relieve the software developers from any liability 
due to harm that their product may cause (Beard et al., 2010; Rustad & Koenig, 2005).  
One might ask whether one can counter EULA by suing software producers for breach of warranty under 
contract laws. The United States has contract laws that one could use to sue software producers for 
breach of implied and expressed warranties (Goertzel, 2016). For instance, if COTS software does not 
work as promised, promoted, and marketed, one could use contract laws to sue software producers 
(Rustad & Koenig, 2005). However, the liabilities under this approach involve only the cost of the software. 
Furthermore, U.S. court rulings (in cases brought under contract breach) interpret software license 
agreements (i.e., EULA) as fair contracts and have always sided with software developers. These rulings 
also presume that the threat agents, not software developers, are primarily responsible for cybersecurity 
incidents (Chong, 2013). Finally, it is unclear if the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which defines the 
widely accepted interpretation of civil contract law in the USA, applies to: 1) software licenses because 
they do not transfer ownership but only the right to use the developer-owned product from the producer to 
the user and 2) free software applications/platforms whose producers do not charge users to use the them 
(Chong, 2013).  
One may also ask about using the tort theory of negligence to hold software producers legally accountable 
for their vulnerable products. This law applies to anyone under a contract to deliver the services of 
producing, maintaining, or supporting the software product or another service in which delivering the 
software product plays a role (Goertzel, 2016). The approach rests on the premise that: 1) the software 
vendor owes the user a duty to provide functioning software, 2) the software did not live up to that 
standard, 3) the user suffered harm, and 4) the software caused that harm. The software user faces a 
challenge in proving that software vulnerabilities resulted from the producer’s failure to apply due care 
when designing or implementing the software. The software developers can successfully defend against 
negligence if they can prove that they could not have detected and corrected the vulnerability that caused 
the security breach through “reasonable” software development practices. A more rigorous form of tort 
negligence is tort theory of malpractice, which holds defendants in recognized licensed professions such 
as medicine, architecture, engineering, and so on liable. To use this approach, the plaintiff must prove that 
the software developers belong to a recognized, ideally government-licensed, profession and have failed 
to comply with the standards of that profession while engineering the defective software product (Goertzel, 
2016). However, this approach suffers from the fact that a widely recognized system of professional 
licensure for software developers has not yet been established in the US or elsewhere.  
To summarize, specific laws that target threat agents and custodians of protected data exist. While the 
laws targeting custodians of protected data have been somewhat effective in motivating organizations to 
better protect data, a lack of attribution and jurisdiction often constrain the laws that target threat agents. 
At present, no specific laws target software producers. Therefore, we must use existing laws on product 
liability, contract, and malpractice to take legal action against vulnerable software producers. However, 
EULA often successfully challenge these laws. The lack of consensus on whether software is a product or 
a service adds to the legal challenge. The opinion of some that software code expresses free speech 
further complicates the matter. For example, the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in 1999 that the 
First Amendment protects source code (Balakrishnan, 2016). More recently, Apple, in a case against FBI, 
used the First Amendment as defense to prevent the FBI from forcing it to extract data from a confiscated 
iPhone. If the view that “software classifies as free speech” gains momentum, then it will become much 
more difficult to prosecute software producers. 
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6 Conclusion 
Organizations continue to allocate increasing resources towards cybersecurity initiatives. Despite these 
efforts, the frequency of cyberattacks continues to grow. I propose that vulnerable software, certain 
economic factors, a lack of legal accountability for software producers and certain types of threat agents, 
and software users’ behavior contribute to poor cybersecurity. Figure 10 illustrates some of these 
challenges to cybersecurity. 
 
Figure 20. Factors Contributing Towards Poor Cybersecurity 
I believe that vulnerable software constitutes the main reason for poor cybersecurity. However, due to 
certain technical (e.g., product complexity), economic (e.g., information asymmetry, release first patch 
later, perverse incentives), and legal (e.g., ineffective laws targeting software producers) reasons, 
software developers will continue to produce vulnerable software. While software developers use various 
development strategies to minimize the vulnerabilities in their software, they seem to have given up on the 
goal to produce vulnerability-free software. Appropriate public policies that eliminate perverse incentives 
and encourage software developers to spend more resources on eliminating bugs before releasing their 
software can address the economic reasons that contribute to the availability of vulnerable software. 
However, we have yet to see any meaningful steps taken in this direction. Finally, we also need to modify 
and update the laws relevant to cybersecurity to encourage software producers to write more secure 
code. Even if we assume, for a moment, that we have vulnerability-free software, effective laws, and 
relevant public polies, we still need to address the behavioral challenges that individual users of software 
pose. As long as these individuals remain careless, apathetic, and unaware about their role in improving 
cybersecurity, the state of cybersecurity will remain weak.  
Given the current challenges to cybersecurity and our inability to overcome them so far, it would be 
unrealistic to expect reasonable cybersecurity anytime soon. One can only hope that, over a longer 
period, security researchers, software developers, legal scholars, public officials, and software users will 
better understand their role in improving cybersecurity. As a result, they might be more successful in 
addressing some of the challenges that I present in this paper. 
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